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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
David Hitchcock argues that a good argument is one where the corresponding 
material and counterfactual conditionals are such that their universal 
generalizations have no false substitution instances. Further, he proposes adopting 
Pearl’s structure equation modelling (SEM) analysis of counterfactual conditionals 
vs. Lewis and Stalnaker’s “closest world” approach, on the grounds that it is easier to 
determine the truth-value of counterfactuals using Pearl’s approach. Although I tend 
to agree with Hitchcock’s account of what a good deductive argument is, the account 
does not apply to non-deductive arguments, thereby lacking generality. In addition, 
Hitchcock’s endorsement of Pearl’s SEM semantics makes a lot of sense, though 
perhaps not for the reason that Hitchcock suggests. I shall argue that verifying 
counterfactuals is just as difficult if not more difficult using SEM semantics as for 
closest-world semantics. However, one advantage that SEM semantics has over 
closest-world semantics is that it is more general in the sense that it can be applied 
to non-recursive models. On the other hand, the distinction between “endogenous” 
vs. “exogenous” variables in structural equation modelling is not always so clear, 
which poses a real difficulty for the SEM approach. Finally, possible world semantics 
fares much better than SEM semantics with respect to evaluating counterfactual 
conditionals in mathematics and logic. 
 
2.  THERE ARE ARGUMENTS AND THEN THERE ARE ARGUMENTS 
 
Although an account of implicitly deductive arguments, empirical or otherwise, in 
terms of covering generalizations is as good as any other, not all arguments are 
amenable to such an account. There are many non-deductive arguments that cannot 
be evaluated using the covering generalization approach. For example, if a group of 
researchers are conducting a study on the effectiveness of an experimental drug, 
their arguments will not be such that the conclusions of the study “follow” in any 
sense of “follow” from the premises. At best, all they can hope for is that a statistical 
analysis such as analysis of variance, chi-square, etc. will help make sense of their 
results. In no scientific paper that I have read, and I have read many as a biologist in 
training, is there a claim that the conclusions of the study follow from the data. Yet 
we wouldn’t want to say that the researchers are bad arguers. 
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 There is already an account of what constitutes a good non-deductive 
argument such as those that appear in scientific arguments, viz., inferential 
statistics. Or at least, this is the best we have to date. The call for a “logic of 
induction” is at this point in time best answered by the statistician and probability 
theorist. If I am a researcher who claims that drug X is better than the alternatives 
on the market, then instead of consulting a logic text on how to argue, I would 
consult a statistician, a statistics text, or a program such as SPSS. 
 
3. SEM SEMANTICS IS NO CLOSER TO PROVIDING A RELATIVELY EASY MEANS OF 
EVALUATING COUNTERFACTUALS THAN CLOSEST WORLDS SEMANTICS 
 
Hitchcock claims that Pearl’s SEM semantics provides an easier method for 
evaluating counterfactuals than closest world semantics. Consider the 
counterfactual conditional discussed by Hitchcock, viz., “if Putin lived in the White 
House, then he would live in Washington.” According to Hitchcock, this conditional 
is difficult to evaluate using Lewis’ possible worlds semantics since if one thing 
changes, many other things will too. Then exactly how close will the world in which 
Putin lives in the White House be to the actual world? And in fact, suggests 
Hitchcock, there may be no closest world to the actual world where Putin lives in 
the White House, meaning that the conditional cited above is only vacuously true.  
Hitchcock’s reservations regarding closest world semantics are spot on, but the 
situation with SEM is no better.  
 According to Pearl’s SEM semantics for counterfactuals in terms of structural 
equations, to evaluate “if Putin lived in the White House, he would live in 
Washington” it would be necessary to change structural equations in the model.  But 
how many would we have to change? In SEM causal models, endogenous variables 
may be related to any number of other variables, and causation may be bidirectional 
in non-recursive models, so that changing an equation relating two variables could 
have major effects on other equations, ad infinitum. Further, as Hitchcock 
acknowledges, there are many different causal paths leading to Putin’s living in the 
White House. But he excludes such paths as Putin’s having a relationship with 
Michelle Obama as being a remote possibility. This seems somewhat arbitrary, since 
as unlikely as it may be, this could happen and thus it can’t be entirely discounted. 
Further, perhaps there was a major war, and Putin took over the United States. 
There are countless variables that need to be considered, and countless structural 
equations relating these variables that may need to be changed. 
 An additional practical difficulty with SEM semantics is that is it not always 
clear whether a variable is endogenous or exogenous. Presumably, an exogenous 
variable is such that it is not changed by the endogenous variables in the model. For 
example, if a farmer raises their crop production in a given season, this will not have 
a noticeable effect on the market price of the crop, so that price is treated as 
exogenous. On the other hand, if all the farmers in the province of Ontario were to 
increase their crop production, this may indeed influence the price of the crop. 
(http://academic.reed.edu/economics/course_pages/red_spots/endogenous_and_e
xogenous_v.htm) Similarly, if Russia went to war with the United States, and Russia 
BRIAN MACPHERSON 
3 
won, this may influence the location of the White House. In a Russian victory, the 
White House might be moved to Moscow. 
 On the good side, an SEM semantics for counterfactuals has the distinct 
advantage that it is more general than a Lewisian possible world semantics since it 
applies not only to recursive causal models, but to slightly more general kinds of 
causal models where equations have unique solutions and finally to non-recursive 
models where two endogenous variables may causally influence one another 
(Halpern, 2010). According to Halpern, this possibility was not even recognized by 
Pearl himself since he restricted himself to only recursive causal models (Halpern, 
2010). If Hitchcock is to endorse an SEM semantics for counterfactuals, it should be 
on grounds of generality vs. ease of evaluation of counterfactuals. 
 
4. MATHEMATICALLY SPEAKING 
 
One serious limitation of an SEM semantics for counterfactual conditionals is that it 
does not straightforwardly apply to conditionals in mathematics. Consider Fermat’s 
Last Theorem (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fermat's_Last_Theorem): 
 
No three positive integers x, y, z can satisfy the equation xn + yn + zn for any 
integer value of n greater than 2.  
 
Now, consider the following counterfactual conditional: If x = 2, y = 4, z = 12, then 
the equation xn + yn + zn would have a solution for n = 3. It is not clear how one could 
demonstrate the falsity of this conditional using SEM semantics, since there are no 
structural equations causally relating endogenous variables. In fact, what would 
count as an endogenous or exogenous variable in this case? Are numbers causally 
related? However, Lewis’ possible worlds semantics would provide us with a 
method of evaluating this counterfactual conditional. Consider the closest 
mathematically/logically possible world to the actual world where x = 2, y = 4, z = 
12. In such a world, there would be no solution for  xn + yn + zn. Thus, the conditional 
cited above is false. 
 
5. CONCLUSION  
 
While I agree with Hitchcock’s account of good arguers re: deductive arguments in 
terms of covering generalizations, the account does not apply to non-deductive 
arguments amenable to evaluation from the perspective of inferential statistics. 
Further, although his endorsement of SEM semantics for empirically-based 
counterfactual conditionals makes sense from the perspective of generality, a 
Lewisian closest-world semantics is the only way to go with respect to evaluating 
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